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RIGGINS v. NEVADA FAILS TO RESOLVE TlE
CONFLICT OVER FORCIBLY MEDICATING THE
INCOMPETENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
INTRODUCTION
"JUSTICE... is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed." I The harm
often inflicted on persons whom the state chooses to forcibly medicate with
antipsychotic drugs2 represents a severe intrusion into the personal liberties
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.3 The case of Riggins v. Nevada4
examines the boundaries of this issue. The question raised is whether a criminal
defendant may refuse to take antipsychotic drugs given to him to ensure his
competence to stand trial.5 The Riggins Court decided that, under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, a criminal defendant possesses a significant
liberty interest in remaining free of unwanted medication. 6 Because the Court
acknowledged the potential prejudice antipsychotic drugs may have on the
defendant's trial, 7 this decision appears to seriously limit the state's power to
forcibly medicate individuals. But upon examining the Court's discussion of the
state's compelling interest in bringing an accused to trial, 8 the amount of protection
a criminal defendant may actually expect seems to be seriously jeopardized.
The purpose of this casenote is to assess the propriety of the Riggins Court's
decision and highlight some problems with the Court's reasoning. This note
GEORGE K. STRODACH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICURUS 83 (Northwestern University Press 1963)
(quoting LEADING DOCTRINE 33 ).
2 Antipsychotic drugs include such medications as Mellaril, Thorazine, Haldol, and Prolixin. John M.
Davis & Johnathan 0. Cole, Antipsychotic Drugs in 5 AM. HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 441, 445 (2d ed.
1975); These drugs are commonly used in the treatment of schizophrenic patients. Id. at 442; More
recently these drugs have been used to control violent tendencies and make mentally ill persons accused
of crimes competent to stand trial. See infra notes 23-27.
3 The forcible medication of antipsychotic drugs into a nonconsenting person's body represents a
substantial interference with that person's fundamental constitutional liberties. Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 230 (1990); The freedom from bodily restraint is at the very core of the liberty interests protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982).
The right to be let alone is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); No right is more sacred or
more carefully guarded than the right of every person to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others. Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1890).
4 112 S. CL 1810 (1992).
5 Id. at 1813.
6 Id. at 1815. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that".
. . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
7 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816. (stating that it is very possible that the drugs affected Riggins ability to
follow the trial proceedings, to communicate with counsel and to answer questions on direct and cross-
examination).
8 See Id. at 1815-1817.
1
Ferrell: Riggins v. Nevada
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993
AKRON LAW REVIEW
begins by discussing antipsychotic drugs and their side effects. Next, this note
explores the ways in which courts have responded to the state's power to compel
such medication, followed by an explanation of the types of objections raised to
prevent this intrusion. Then, this casenote analyzes the Court's discussion of
Riggins' eighth amendment claim, his liberty interest in avoiding forced
medication, and the trial prejudice which antipsychotic drugs can cause. Finally,
this note analyzes the discussion of the state's compelling interest in bringing
defendants to trial.
BACKGROUND
Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs
Antipsychotic drugs9 were first introduced in the 1950's in the treatment of
psychosis and other mental disorders. 10 The primary benefit of these drugs is their
effectiveness in the treatment of acute symptoms of the mentally ill. "1 However,
there has been great concern over the harmful, disabling and irreversible side
effects which these drugs commonly produce.1 2 One such effect, akinesia, causes
lethargy, apathy and drooling. 13 Another common side effect, akathisia, causes
constant restlessness or jumpiness.' 4  Tardive dyskinesia, an irreversible
neurological disorder which patients taking antipsychotics frequently experience,
causes involuntary muscular movements which can permanently cripple the
patient.15 In some cases, patients taking this medication suffer an effect called
neuroleptic malignant syndrome, which can cause death by cardiac arrest. 16
9 These drugs are also sometimes called "neuroleptics" or "psychotropic drugs." Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 214 (1990).
10 Thomas G. Guthiel M.D. & Paul S. Appelbaum M.D. , "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity.," "Artificial
Competence," And Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects Of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 77, 117-19 (1983).
11 See Davis & Cole, supra note 2, at 442.
'2 See generally A REVIEW OF CALIFORNIA'S PROGRAMS FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED: PUBLIC
HEARING ON H.R. 106 BEFORE THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, 12-14 (Nov. 3, 1977) (hereinafter CALIFORNIA'S PROGRAMS) (stating
that antipsychotic drugs may have dangerous side effects); Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right Is It
Anyway?: Rethinking Competency To Stand Trial In Light Of The Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109 (1986) (same); Stephen Bauer, Comment, Madness And Medicine: The Forcible
Administration Of Psychotropic Drugs, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 497 (same).
L3 See CALIFORNIA'S PROGRAMS, supra note 12 at 12-13 (discussing the effects of akinesia, which
include a sense of apathy).
14 Id. at 14 (stating that akathisia causes the patient to feel restless and may even cause panic).
15 Bauer, supra note 12, at 532 (stating that tardive dyskinesia can cripple the patient);
16 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815. See also 3 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY
2809 (1986) (stating that continued use of the drugs may cause permanent mpairment of brain function or
even death); The drugs may also cause liver damage, convulsions, involuntary rigidity, and changes in
heart rate that can lead to cardiac arrest. Id
[Vol. 26:2
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Limits of the State's Power to Compel Antipsychotic Drugs
It is a fundamental concept that the state may not bring a person to trial who
is incompetent. 17 States have used antipsychotic drugs to render incompetent
defendants fit to stand trial.18 Antipsychotic medication in general is relatively
new to the courts. The first case to address the use of such drugs to make a
criminal defendant competent for trial was not decided until 1969 in State v.
Hampton. 9 In Hampton, the defendant was charged with attempted murder. 2
While awaiting trial, she began taking antipsychotic medication to become legally
competent. 2  The Hampton court held that if a defendant chooses to be medicated
with antipsychotic drugs in order to become competent to stand trial, the state may
not prevent it. 21
Many early courts extended the Hampton decision to justify permitting the
state to force defendants to take this medication to guarantee their competence or
safety at trial.23 Beside trial competency, states have forcibly administered
antipsychotic medication to civilly committed mental patients24 and pre-trial
detainees. 5 In Washington v. Harper,26 the Supreme Court recently addressed the
issue of forcibly medicating a convicted prisoner.27 The Washington Court held
17 See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that it is rudimentary that the state
may not try someone who is incompetent); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (stating that a
person who does not have the capacity to understand the proceedings against him may not be subjected to
a trial); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
18 See State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379 (N.H. 1978); State v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976);
State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302 (S.C. 1978).
19 218 So. 2d 311 (La. 1969).
20ld.
21 id. at 311-312.
2 Id at 312.
23 See State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379 (N.H. 1978) (holding that the state may medicate the defendant to
maintain his competence for trial); State v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976); (same); State v.
Law, 244 S.E. 2d 302 (S.C. 1978) (same); But See State v. Maryott, 422 P.2d 239 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)
(holding that state may not compel medication to make defendant competent for trial).
24 See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929-30 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (recognizing that even an
institutionalized patient retains a fundamental right to privacy and the forced administration of
antipsychotic medication represents a significant invasion of that privacy); accord Rogers v. Okin, 634
F.2d 650, 653-54 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 451 U.S. 906 (1981), appeal dismissed sub. nom., Mills v.
Rogers, 454 U.S. 936 (1981), later proceeding Mills v. Rogers, 454 U.S. 1136 (1982), vacated, Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 294 (1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291 (1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1989).
25 See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985) (holding
that a state may only forcibly medicate a defendant if it shows a compelling interest and no less intrusive
means are available); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 484 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating that a
mentally ill pre-trial detainee has a constitutionally protected interest in deciding whether to accept or
refuse medication).
26 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
27 The prisoner in Harper was forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs by the prison officials after they
determined that the prisoner's mental state presented a danger to himself and others in the prison. Id at
214. A special committee, consisting of a psychiatrist, a psychologist and the Associate Superintendent
of the facility held a hearing to determine if the medication was necessary, at which Harper was present
and had the assistance of a nurse practitioner for his defense. Id at 217. The prisoner, Harper challenged
the decision to medicate him and on appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court held that the highly
3
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that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment confers a significant
liberty interest on a state prisoner in avoiding unwanted medication. 2
In Pate v. Robinson,9 the Supreme Court established that due process
prohibits the trial of a criminal defendant who is incompetent.30 The current
standard for determining competence to stand trial was set out by the Court in
Dusky v. United States. 31 This standard requires that the defendant have a present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of understanding, and a
rational, factual understanding of the proceedings against him. 3- There have been
several constitutional bases put forth to justify a "right to refuse" when the state
attempts to forcibly medicate a defendant to make him competent to stand trial
under Dusky. In Winston v. Lee,33 which has been frequently cited in support of a
right to refuse medication at trial, the Supreme Court decided that when a state
attempts to compel a medical procedure, it has intruded on a defendant's fourth
amendment right to privacy. 34
Youngberg v. Romeon also lends support to a right to refuse medication
necessary to attain competence for trial. The Supreme Court in Youngberg
recognized that a person has a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth
amendment in being free from bodily restraint. 6 Courts have also found that a
right to refuse antipsychotic medication at trial exists under the first amendment
protection of freedom of thought.37 In Illinois v. Allen,38 the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the defendant's physical appearance before the jury may
intrusive nature of the medication required the state to show a compelling interest before medicating a
prisoner. Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358, 364-65 (Wash. 1988), motion granted, cert. granted, Washington
v. Harper, 489 U.S. 1064 (1989) rev'd, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
28 Harper, 494 U.S. at 221.
29 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
30 Id. at 386. This principle was reaffirmed by the Court in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975).
31 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
I d. at 402.
33 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
34 Id. at 765-67. The Court determined that the compelled surgical removal of a bullet, which involved
serious medical risks to the defendant, interfered with his fourth amendment privacy rights to be secure in
his person. Id. The Court then held that the state must show a compelling interest before it could subject
a criminal defendant to such a dangerous medical procedure. ld. at 762.
" 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
36 Id. at 320. While Youngberg was concerned with a mental patient's right to be free from physical
restraints, id. at 316, the principle has been applied by several courts in finding that this interest justifies
a criminal defendant's tight to refuse medication necessary to make him competent for trial. See, e.g.
United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 488-90 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that just as the Supreme Court in
Youngberg balanced the patients liberty interests against the state's interests, a defendant's liberty
interests must be weighed against the state's interest in bringing him to trial); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d
1387, 1394-95 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985) (stating that under Youngberg, a state
may only overcome a defendant's liberty interest by showing a compelling interest).
37 See Bee, 744 F.2d at 1395 (holding that the liberty and first amendment interests outweigh the state's
interest in medicating a defendant to attain competence for trial).
38 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
[Vol. 26:2
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prejudice his fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial. 1 Another justification
supporting a defendant's right to refuse medication is that the drugs deny the
defendant a fair trial by interfering with his fundamental sixth amendment right to
present a full defense. 1°
STATEMENT OFT HE CASE
In November 1987, David Riggins was arrested for the murder of a man
found knifed to death.41 Shortly after his arrest, Riggins complained to a
psychiatrist treating him in jail that he was hearing voices in his head and having
trouble sleeping." The psychiatrist then prescribed Mellaril, an antipsychotic drug,
to Riggins4 3 While awaiting trial, three court-appointed psychiatrists examined
Riggins while he was taking the medication to determine his competence to stand
trial.41 Two of the three psychiatrists concluded that Riggins was competent to
stand trial while taking the medication. 45 The trial court then ruled Riggins
competent and ordered the trial to proceed. 6
Before the trial began, Riggins' defense counsel moved for a court order
suspending the forced medication to Riggins until after the trial.47 The court held a
hearing on the issue at which medical testimony showed that there was only a
small possibility that Riggins could become incompetent if taken off the
medication, but that it was not likely.41 Nonetheless, the trial court issued an order
denying Riggins' motion to suspend.49 The trial then proceeded with Riggins
subjected to the medication for the duration.-IO Riggins presented an insanity
0 See id. at 344 (stating that a defendant's appearance before the jury bound and gagged was such a
severe intrusion that it could only be justified in the most extreme cases). Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,
78-79 (1985) (noting that the right to a fair trial is guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment); Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 502 (1976) (stating that the right to a fair trial is a fundamental right under the
fourteenth amendment). But see State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 307 (S.C. 1978) (deciding that any
prejudice which defendant may suffer from being medicated with antipsychotic drugs may be cured by
informing the jury that the defendant is taking the drugs and of the effects the drugs).
40 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (holding that the sixth amendment provides the
rights essential to having a fair defense, rights which are a basic part of the due process of the fourteenth
amendment). Antipsychotic drugs can significantly impair this right by causing the defendant difficulty in
remembering and reasoning, which will have a serious effect on his ability to assist his counsel in his own
defense. Michele K. Bachand, Note, Antipsychotic Drugs And The Incompetent Defendant: A Perspective
On The Treatment And Prosecution Of Incompetent Defendants, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1059, 1077
(1990).
41 Riggins, 112 S. CL at 1812.
421d
43 id
44 id
'Id The third psychiatrist concluded that Riggins was incompetent to stand trial even while taking the
medication. Id
46 id
47
.,
48 Petitioners Brief at 7, Riggins, 112 S. CL 1810 (1992) (No. 90-8466) available on LEXIS, Genfed
lLbrary, Briefs File).
4' Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1813.
50 Id
Fall, 1992]
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defense and testified on his own behalf. 5' But the jury still convicted him of first
degree murder, and in a separate sentence hearing sentenced Riggins to death. m
Riggins appealed directly to the Nevada Supreme Court, claiming that the
forced administration of Mellaril denied him his constitutional right to assist in his
own defense and prejudiced him in the eyes of the jurors. 5 But the Nevada
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. 54 The court held that any prejudice
Riggins suffered was corrected by the admission of expert testimony informing
the jury of the effect antipsychotic medication has on a person's demeanor. 6 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether forced
administration of antipsychotic medication during trial violated rights guaranteed
by the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 56
ANALYSIS
Eighth Amendment Claim
The Court began its analysis by dismissing out of hand Riggins' claim that
his eighth amendment rights were violated at trial. 5 Riggins alleged that the state's
administration of antipsychotic drugs to him unfairly prejudiced him in the eyes of
the jurors during his sentencing hearing.58 Riggins argued that the effects of these
drugs made him appear apathetic, uncaring, zombie-like and without remorse in
the eyes of the jurors. 9 Despite this possible prejudice, the Court properly decided
that since Riggins had not raised this argument at a lower court or in his petition
for certiorari, the Court would not address it. 0
Liberty Interest
The Court then moved directly into what it considered Riggins' core
argument, that the forced administration of medication to Riggins violated his
511id
Id
521d
54 Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535 (Nev. 1991).
Idtl at 538.
56 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814.57 id
9 Id. To a jury, a defendant medicated with antipsychotic drugs may appear unemotional and
unconcerned about the proceedings at hand. Fentiman, supra note 12, at 1128-31. The defendant may also
suffer side effects causing him to act restless and overly nervous, which could cause the jury to believe he
has a guilty mind and be prejudiced against him. Id. at 1130. See also, Bachand, supra note 40, at 1080.
(stating that a jury will invariably use its perceptions of the defendant's courtroom appearance to judge the
defendant's prior mental state in every criminal case, and particularly in insanity cases).
5' See Petitioners Brief at 6-7, Riggins, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) No. 90-8466) available on LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Briefs File.
(0 Riggins, 112 S. CL at 1814.
[Vol. 26:2
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fourteenth amendment due process rights. 6 The Court started its discussion by
reviewing its recent decision in Washington v. Harper. 1 The Washington Court
held that a convicted state prisoner still retains a liberty interest in not being
medicated against his will. The Riggins Court stated that the forcible
administration of antipsychotic drugs represents a particularly severe interference
with a person's liberty because the drugs can have serious and even fatal side
effects." The Court acknowledged that the fourteenth amendment provides at least
the same amount of protection to a criminal defendant, who is presumed innocent,
as it does to a convicted prisoner.65 The Court then decided that it was error for the
trial court to refuse to discontinue Riggins' medication without recognizing his
liberty interest and weighing it against the relevant state interests. 6
The Court's decision to extend the holding in Washington finally sets a firm
standard for all courts to apply in considering whether a defendant may refuse
antipsychotic medication at trial. This standard puts an end to the sharp split of
authority among the courts over whether a defendant has a constitutionally
protected right in avoiding such medication.67 This decision logically follows from
the Supreme Court's prior holdings suggesting that any time a state forcibly
administers medication to an individual, it has intruded on that person's protected
liberty interest.68
611d
494 U.S. 210 (1990).
l. at 221.
(4 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814. The drugs alter the chemical balance of a person's brain. In addition,
neuroleptic malignant syndrome can cause death by cardiac arrest. Id. at 1815.
65 Id. "Pre-trial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional
rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners." (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545
(1979)).
66 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
67 See, e.g., Brian Domb, Note, A New Twist in the War on Drugs: The Constitutional Right of a Mentally Ill
Criminal Defendant to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication That Would Make Him Competent to Stand Trial, 4
J.L. & HEALTH 273 (1990) (There has been clear disagreement within the judicial system on the issue of
forcibly medicating a person with antipsychotic drugs); Id. at 273 (Both civil and criminal arenas would
benefit greatly from direct and clear Supreme Court guidance on the issue of forced medication); Jarvis v.
levine, 418 N.W. 2d 139 (Minn. 1988) (placing very tight restrictions on when a mental patient may be
forcibly medicated); State v. Maryott, 492 P.2d 239, 240 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that no state
interest could justify the intrusive control over an accused which such drugs represent). But See Also,
State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379, 1381-1382 (N.H. 1978) (stating that a criminal defendant does not have an
absolute right to refuse medication at trial); State v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296, 1300 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976)
(same); State v. Law, 244 S.E. 2d 302 (S.C. 1978) (same).
a3 "The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial
interference with that person's liberty." Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990). Freedom from
bodily restraint is at the core of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1980). The right to be free from unjustified intrusions on personal security is
one of the historic liberty interests protected by the due process clause. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492
(1980). "Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). The right to be let alone is the most
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Fall, 19921
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Trial Prejudice
The Court next went on to consider whether Riggins' due process right to a fair
trial was prejudiced by the forced administration of the antipsychotic drugs. 9
Ultimately, the Court balks at answering this question. But the Court does state
that it is clearly possible that the side effects of the drugs impacted Riggins'
outward appearance, his testimony on direct and cross-examination, his ability to
follow the proceedings, or his communication with counsel.70 But the Court chose
not to decide this issue. 71 The Court stated that because the trial judge gave no
reasoning for his refusal to order the discontinuation of the medication, it was
impossible to tell whether Riggins had been prejudiced. 7
As Justice Kennedy points out in his concurring opinion, there are serious
problems involved in forcibly medicating a defendant during trial. 73 When the
state forcibly medicates a defendant during his trial for the stated purpose of
changing his behavior, the state has acted much the same as if it had manipulated
material evidence. 74  Justice Kennedy points out that the side effects of
antipsychotics can alter a defendant's demeanor and make him unable or at least
unwilling to assist his own deferse counsel.75 This is a particularly serious
concern because the principal value served by the defendant's presence at trial is his
ability to give advice and suggestions to his counsel during the course of the trial.776
Although several commentators have seriously questioned whether a defendant
medicated with antipsychotic drugs can ever truly receive a fair trial, 7 the Supreme
Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
Id. at 1816. See generally Fentiman, supra note 12 (discussing the mind altering effects of
antipsychotic drugs); Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutional Right To Refuse Antipsychotic Medications,
8 BL.LAM.ACAD.PSYCHIATRY & L. 179 (1980) (same); Bauer, supra note 12 (same).
71 Riggins, 112 S. CL at 1816.
7-Id.
73 Id at 1817 ("Involuntary medication with antipsychotic drugs poses a serious threat to a defendant's
right to a fair trial") (Kennedy, J., concurring).
74 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5 lId at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Steve Tomashefsky, Comment, Antipsychotic Drugs and
Fitness to Stand Trial: The Right of The Unifit Accused to Refuse Treatment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 773, 782
(1985). (Stating that drugs which affect the emotions may inhibit the defendant's ability to function
properly as a defendant by diminishing his motivation to advise his lawyer about such things as the cross-
examination of witnesses); Domb supra note 67, at 302. (Stating that the effects of these drugs may well
give the defendant such diminished anxiety, and unnatural apathy that he feels an increased level of trust
for his adversaries).
% Tomashefsky, supra note 75, at 782. One common side effect of antipsychotic medication, Akinesia,
makes a defendant feel lethargic and indifferent. California's Programs, supra note 12, at 12-13; This
effect may make a defendant too apathetic to care about the outcome, even though he does in fact
comprehend what is happening. Bachand, supra note 40, at 1078; The emotional apathy and lack of
initiative symptomatic of Akinesia, combined with the physical restlessness symptomatic of Akathisia,
produces a defendant who, even though he may be competent to be on trial, is not likely to help himself or
his attorney during his trial. Tomashefsky, supra note 75, at 786.
77 See Fentiman, supra note 12, at 1125-35 (arguing that if a defendant is tried in a medicated state, he
may not even have a chance for a fair trial). The right to have a fair trial is so fundamental to society that
the state should not be permitted to coerce the defendant into a position of even potential prejudice.
Tomashefsky, supra note 75, at 789.
[Vol. 26:2
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss2/7
RiGGINS V. N EVADA
Court failed to settle this issue.8 The reason the Court stopped short of deciding
the trial prejudice issue could be its desire to wait for a more suitable case to come
before it, before announcing a rule of law expanding the amount of trial prejudice
that the state may compel a defendant to undergo. 9
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, acknowledged that the fourteenth amendment
confers a fundamental right to a fair trial on every criminal defendant83 But
Thomas asserted that Riggins did receive a fair trial.A' Thomas argued that before
Riggins' conviction is reversed, he should be required to show how he was actually
prejudiced by the medication. 2 But Thomas fails to fully realize the limited extent
of the Court's holding and the constitutional interests at stake. First of all, the
Court did not reverse Riggins' conviction because it found his trial rights had been
prejudiced. In fact, the Court specifically found that it was impossible to tell from
the record if Riggins had been prejudiced. " The Court reversed the conviction
because the trial judge had failed to recognize Riggins' liberty interest in avoiding
unwanted medication when he decided to refuse to order that the drug be
discontinued. 8
Secondly, in contrast to Justice Thomas' assertion, the burden does not fall on
Riggins to show how he was prejudiced from taking the medication. Once the
state medicated Riggins against his will, it took on the obligation to show that the
drug was necessary to further an essential state policy.83 There is an important
reason why a defendant medicated with these drugs should not bear the burden of
showing how his trial was prejudiced. Another very common symptom of
antipsychotic drugs is an impaired ability to remember. 85 Because of this, it would
78 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816. Instead, the Court remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether
Riggins would be prejudiced. Id at 1816-1817.
'79 One point that the Court might have had difficulty with, is the fact that it would be setting forth a rule
for determining whether the state may forcibly medicate a defendant to make him competent for trial, but
in this case, Riggins was never actually found to be incompetent while not under the influence of the
medication. The trial court never ordered Riggins to be examined while not taking the drugs. The
psychiatrists who found Riggins to be competent, had examined him only while he was being given daily
doses of the antipsychotic medication. Id. at 1812; Another point that may have been troublesome to the
court is that the psychiatrist who prescribed the drugs for Riggins did not do so because he believed it was
necessary to make Riggins competent to stand trial. The psychiatrist prescribed the drugs only because
Riggins told him he was hearing voices in his head and could not sleep. Id.; There is also the problem of
finding alternatives to the drugs to make a defendant competent to stand trial. As discussed infra notes
101-104, there has not been any research done to determine whether antipsychotic drugs are the least
intrusive means of attaining trial competence. The Court may, therefore, want to see a case addressing
this issue, and one where the defendant's incompetence is properly determined.
8D Id. at 1822. ("The due process clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal
trial") (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967)).
81 Riggins, 112 S. CL at 1822.
82 Id at 1822-23.
83 Id at 1816. ("Efforts to prove or disprove actual prejudice from the record before use would be futile").
8' See id
85 Id. at 1815. (Stating that once Riggins objected to the state forcibly medicating him, the state became
obligated to establish the need for Mellaril and the medical appropriateness of the drug).
95 See Fentiman, supra note 12, at 1132 (Stating that antipsychotics can impair a person's memory,
reasoning ability and ability to function on a normal basis); Bauer, supra note 12, at 512, 534 (same).
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be fundamentally unfair to forcibly medicate a defendant, and then, after he is
convicted, to require him to demonstrate what he might have done differently if he
had not been medicated. Such tactics would truly give life to Orwell's picture of
life in Oceania.87
Compelling Interest
The Court stated that the reason it agreed to hear this case was to decide
whether the forced administration of antipsychotic medication during trial violated
rights guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments.88 In the end, the Court
fails to decide this question and leaves much confusion about exactly what it
expects from the trial court on remand. w But the Court does give strong
indications about how it would decide a case brought to it where the lower court
did recognize the defendant's liberty interest in deciding to permit forcible
medication.
The Court focused on the state's strong interest in bringing an accused to
trial.9° The Court went on to state that it is not yet adopting a strict scrutiny
standard in these forced medication cases, because the trial court made no findings
of fact that would show a compelling state interest that outweighed Riggins' liberty
interest. 91 However, the Court did point out that the state of Nevada would have
satisfied strict scrutiny if it had shown that the medication was medically
appropriate, necessary to bring Riggins to trial, and there were no less intrusive
alternatives available.92 The Court then flatly stated that trial prejudice can be
justified by showing a compelling state interest.93 It would, therefore, appear that
the Court is prepared to permit forcible medication of a criminal defendant, even
where it prejudices his ability to assist in his own defense, because of the state's
strong interest in bringing the accused to trial.94
g7 G EORGE ORWELL, N INErEEN EIGhrY -FOUR (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1949).
88 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814.
89 See id. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Stating that the Court gives little guidance about what the
trial judge is to consider on remand).
90 Id. at 1815. ("The constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of
'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and peace") (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
9' Id. at 1815-1816.
92 Id. at 1815. The Court also states that forced medication at trial would be permissible if it were
necessary for Riggins own safety or the safety of others and the least intrusive means. Id. The Court even
goes so far as to compare forcible medication to binding and gagging a defendant, which is permissible
where it is the "fairest and most reasonable way" to control a disruptive defendant. Id. at 1816 (quoting
Allen, 397 U.S. at 344).
93Id
9 Exactly how much prejudice the court would be willing to compel the defendant to suffer for the sake
of being brought to trial remains to be seen, because the Court failed to address it. But given the Court's
acknowledgement that even the prejudice suffered from binding and gagging a defendant at trial is
acceptable where it is the most reasonable way to control a disruptive defendant, Id. at 1816-17, it would
seem that the Court is willing to permit the defendant to endure a great deal of trial prejudice.
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The Court's rationale that forced medication may be justified by a compelling
state interest is consistent with prior Supreme Court decisions, as well as lower
federal and state court decisions. 95 It has been firmly established that the state has
a compelling interest in bringing an accused to trial.96 However, it must be
remembered that the state also has a compelling interest in ensuring that criminal
trials are fair. 97 Because of the adverse effects of antipsychotic drugs on a
defendant's ability to assist in his own defense, it is highly questionable whether
such a defendant can ever receive a fair trial.8 Therefore, this medication should
not be used to make a defendant competent to stand trial. Because the state's
compelling interest in having fair trials is jeopardized by the use of antipsychotic
drugs, other means of handling mentally incompetent persons who commit crimes
should be explored. 99
Least Intrusive Means
It is important to note that in addressing the state's compelling interest in
bringing defendants to trial, the Court failed to consider the second part of the
analysis, that the means of achieving the state's goal be the least intrusive
available. 00 This failure is understandable because the only occasions which
courts and the medical community have had to consider alternatives to the use of
antipsychotic drugs have been limited to situations involving mental patients, t0°
95 See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1985) (holding that the state may compel removal of a
bullet from a defendant only upon a showing of a compelling interest); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387,
1392-93 (10th cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985) (holding that the state may forcibly medicate
a defendant at trial only if there exists a compelling state interest); State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 307
(1978) (same). But see Rogers v. Commissioner of Dept. of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983)
(holding that absent an emergency situation, no state interest is sufficiently compelling to overcome a
atient's decision to refuse medication).
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
97 The state has a powerful interest in a trial's accuracy in order to preserve respect for the trial system,
especially where the accused may be sentenced to death. Domb, supra note 67, at 280. The interest in
the accuracy of a criminal trial that places a defendant's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely
compelling. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985).
98 United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 493 (4th Cir. 1987). The state's interest in bringing an accused
to trial does not permit the draconian invasion the defendant's liberty and the risk of permanent injury that
antipsychotic drugs represent. Id. at 494.
99 In most cases, the state may choose civil commitment of an incompetent defendant in place of a
criminal trial. See Bachand, supra note 40, at 1073. Civil commitment also partially fulfills the state's
interest in trying the defendant because civil commitment of a defendant protects the public from harm. Id.
Further, civil commitment may, in many cases, meet the punishment aspect of the criminal system
because often commitment is considerably more difficult and stigmatizing than prison. Note,
Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. RE'. 454, 456 (1967).
100 Whenever a state intrudes on a fundamental constitutional right, not only must it show a compelling
interest for doing so, but the means for accomplishing the state's goal must be the -least drastic available.
See. e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); If there are other reasonable ways to achieve
those goals with a lesser burden on the constitutional right, the state may not choose the way of greater
interference. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); The means of achieving the state's interest must
be carefully selected so as to result in the minimum possible infringement of the protected right. United
States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987).
10t See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (permitting soft physical restraints to be used on a
civilly committed mental patient); In the civil commitment environment, valid alternatives have also
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prisoners'1 2 and pre-trial detainees. 0 3 But the alternatives employed in those
situations, such as physical restraints and tranquilizers, were simply used to ensure
the safety of others or the person medicated. 104 None of these alternatives address
the problem of making a person competent to stand trial. Given the lack of
research on alternatives, it may well be that antipsychotic drugs are the least
intrusive means of bringing an incompetent defendant to trial. But in the future,
courts should remain aware that advances in medical technology may produce
other methods that are less intrusive than antipsychotic medication.
Possible Extensions
The Court implied in dicta that forcible medication of an incompetent
defendant would be permissible if it were the least intrusive means of bringing him
to trial.105 Because of this, the next logical step would seem to be for the Court to
specifically rule that a defendant may not refuse such medication if there is no
other way to bring him to trial.106 Given the adverse effects antipsychotics have on
a defendant's ability to assist in his defense and show his true demeanor to the
jury, 107 such a decision will significantly increase the amount of trial prejudice a
defendant can be forced to suffer.
CONCLUSION
The Riggins Court's recognition of a defendant's liberty interest in remaining
free of unwanted medication at trial offers some hope to the incompetent criminal
defendant who does not want to endure the disabling effects of antipsychotic drugs
for the sole purpose of being brought to trial. However, the Court's reasoning
suggests that regardless of this liberty interest, or the trial prejudice, the state may
included seclusion or less intrusive medication like tranquilizers or sedatives. Brooks, supra note 70, at
193.
102 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 226-27 (1990). The Washington Court stated that neither
physical restraints nor seclusion would be as effective as antipsychotic drugs in meeting the state's
legitimate interests in controlling a convicted prisoner, because of the costs and dangers to prison staff;
PAUL H. SOLOFF, Physical Controls: The Use of Seclusion and Restraint in Modern Psychiatric Practice, in
CLINICAL TREATMENT OF THE VIOLENTPERSON 119 (L. Roth ed. 1987) (discussing the costs and dangers
of using physical restraints and seclusion on violent patients).
103 See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1980) (holding
that a pre-trial detainee could be forced to take antipsychotic drugs only where an emergency exists that
cannot be met by less intrusive means such as tranquilizers, sedatives, or segregation).
104 In Youngberg, the mental patient was put in soft arm restraints to keep him from harming himself or
other patients in the hospital. 457 U.S. at 310-311; Similarly, in Harper, the Court justified the use of
antipsychotic drugs on the convicted prisoner by the need to protect the prison staff and administrators. 494
U.S. at 225.
105 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
106 In fact, such a decision may be very close at hand, because Riggins is currently sitting in jail
awaiting re-trial, and he is still being subjected to daily does of the antipsychotic medication. Telephone
interview with the law office of Mace Yampolsky, Counsel for David E. Riggins (Sept. 25, 1992); No
trial date has yet been set, but Riggins' case status is listed as "ongoing". Telephone interview with Clark
County, Nevada, Clerk of Courts (Sept. 25, 1992).
107 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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forcibly medicate defendants because of its compelling interest in bringing an
accused to trial. This raises serious doubt about whether incompetent defendants
have any true protection from the drugs. Because Riggins does not consider
whether antipsychotic medication is the least intrusive means of attaining trial
competency, it remains to be seen whether other methods may satisfy that test.
RICHARD L. FERRELL m
13
Ferrell: Riggins v. Nevada
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss2/7
